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Grounding	  is	  not	  a	  strict	  order1	  Gonzalo	  Rodriguez-­‐Pereyra	  University	  of	  Oxford	  	  1.	  A	   strict	   order	   is	   a	   relation	   that	   is	   transitive,	   irreflexive,	   and	  asymmetric.	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  grounding	  is	  not	  a	  strict	  order.	  More	  precisely,	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  grounding	  is	  neither	  transitive,	  nor	  irreflexive,	  nor	  asymmetric.2	  This	  is	  controversial	  and	  original.	  It	  is	  controversial	  because	  some	  philosophers	  maintain	  that	  grounding	  is	  a	  strict	  order,	  or	  that	  it	  has	  some	  of	  the	  three	  features	  necessary	  for	  being	  a	  strict	  order	  (for	  instance,	  Correia	  (2010)	  and	  Raven	  (2013:	  193–94)	  think	   it	  has	  all	   three;	  Fine	  thinks	   it	   is	   irreflexive	  and	  transitive	  (2010:	  100),	  which	  entails	  it	  is	  also	  asymmetric	  (see	  also	  Fine	  2012:	  56);	  Audi,	  Bennett,	  Rosen,	  and	  Schaffer	  think	  that	  it	  is	  irreflexive	  and	  asymmetric	  (Audi	  2012a:	  102,	  Audi	   2012b:	   691–92,	   Bennett	   forthcoming,	   Schaffer	   2009:	   364,	   Rosen	   2010:	  115–116)).	   And	   it	   is	   original	   because	   although	   some	   philosophers	   have	  maintained	   that	   grounding	   is	   not	   a	   strict	   order	   because	   of	   lacking	   one	   of	   the	  three	  features,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  know	  no	  one	  has	  argued	  that	  it	  lacks	  all	  three	  of	  them	  (Schaffer	  (2012)	  has	  argued	  that	  grounding	  is	  not	  transitive,	  Thompson	  (2014)	  has	   argued	   that	   it	   is	   not	   asymmetric,	   and	   Correia	   (2014)	   has	   rejected	   its	  irreflexivity).3	   Furthermore	   the	   way	   in	   which	   I	   shall	   argue	   for	   my	   thesis	   is	  original,	   since	   some	   of	   my	   examples	   that	   grounding	   is	   neither	   irreflexive,	   nor	  asymmetric,	  nor	   transitive	  will	  be	  examples	  of	   truthmaking	  where	   irreflexivity,	  asymmetry,	  and	  transitivity	  fail.	  	  	  	   The	  structure	  of	   the	  paper	   is	  as	   follows.	   In	  Section	  2	  I	  shall	  characterize	  grounding	   in	   a	   general	   way.	   From	   this	   characterization	   it	   will	   follow	   that	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  A	  referee	  has	  suggested	  that	   I	   should	  use	  the	  phrase	   ‘strict	  partial	  order’,	  but	   in	   fact	   I	  am	  not	  going	  to	  question	  the	  partial	  character	  of	  grounding,	  i.e.	  the	  fact	  that	  grounding	  is	  not	  connected.	  Thus	  I	  shall	  stick	  with	  ‘strict	  order’.	  	  3	  Jenkins	  (2011)	  has	  argued	  that	  one	  should	  not	  assume	  that	  grounding	  is	  irreflexive,	  and	  Barnes	  (2014)	  has	  argued	   that	  dependence	   is	  not	  asymmetric,	  but	   she	  distinguishes	  dependence	   from	  grounding.	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truthmaking	   and	   another	   relation	   that	   I	   shall	   call	   alethic-­‐fact	   grounding	   are	  species	  of	  grounding.	  Thus	   if	   either	  of	   these	   relations	   lacks	  one	  of	   the	   features	  necessary	  for	  being	  a	  strict	  order,	  neither	  is	  grounding	  a	  strict	  order.	  In	  section	  3	  I	   shall	   discuss	   and	   reject	   Schaffer’s	   counterexamples	   to	   the	   transitivity	   of	  grounding.	   In	   section	   4	   I	   shall	   present	   my	   case	   against	   the	   transitivity	   of	  truthmaking.	   In	   section	   5	   I	   shall	   present	   my	   case	   against	   the	   irreflexivity	   of	  truthmaking	   and	   alethic-­‐fact	   grounding.	   In	   section	   6	   I	   shall	   present	   my	   case	  against	  the	  asymmetry	  of	  truthmaking	  and	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding.	  In	  section	  7	  I	  shall	   argue	   that	   a	   contrastive	   quaternary	   relation	   of	   grounding,	   like	   the	   one	  proposed	  by	  Schaffer	  (2012:	  130)	  is	  still	  irreflexive	  and	  asymmetric.	  Section	  8	  is	  a	  brief	  conclusion.	  	  	  2.	  Truthmaking	  is	  the	  relation	  that	  obtains	  between	  a	  true	  proposition	  and	  that	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  it	  is	  true,	  its	  truthmaker.	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  many,	  the	  fact	   that	   Socrates	   is	   white	   is	   the	   truthmaker	   of	   the	   proposition	   <Socrates	   is	  white>.4	   So	   the	   fact	   that	   Socrates	   is	   white	   and	   the	   proposition	   <Socrates	   is	  white>	   are	   related	   by	   the	   truthmaking	   relation.	   Similarly,	   according	   to	   many,	  Socrates	  is	  the	  truthmaker	  of	  the	  proposition	  <Socrates	  exists>.	  So	  Socrates	  and	  the	  proposition	  <Socrates	  exists>	  are	  related	  by	  the	  truthmaking	  relation.	  	  Is	   truthmaking	   a	   case	  of	   grounding?	   I	   think	   it	   is,	   and	  others	   think	   so	   as	  well	  (Schaffer	  2009:	  375,	  Liggins	  2012:	  269;	  cf.	  Schnieder	  2006:	  30).	  The	  relation	  between	  truthmaker	  and	  truth	  seems	  analogous	  to	  the	  relation	  between	  member	  and	  set,	  between	  part	  and	  whole,	  and	  between	  being	  a	  cruel	  action	  and	  being	  a	  wrong	  action,	  and	  these	  are	  all	  initially	  plausible	  cases	  of	  ground	  and	  grounded.	  It	  is	  thus	  initially	  plausible	  that	  truthmaking	  is	  a	  case	  of	  grounding.	  	  Sometimes	   grounding	   is	   characterized	   as	   a	   non-­‐causal	   relation	   of	  dependence	  (Audi	  2012a:	  101,	  2012b:	  690).	  But	  then	  truthmaking	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  grounding,	  since	  the	  proposition	  <Socrates	  is	  white>	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  Socrates	  is	  white.	  What	  depends	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  Socrates	  is	  white	  is	  not	  the	   proposition	   itself,	   but	   its	   truth	   or	   its	   having	   the	   property	   of	   being	   true.	   In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   As	   is	   nowadays	   usual,	   I	   am	   using	   <P>	   to	   stand	   for	   the	   proposition	   that	   P,	   and	   <Socrates	   is	  white>	  to	  stand	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  Socrates	  is	  white.	  And	  I	  shall	  let	  [P]	  stand	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  P.	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other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  proposition	  exists	  that	  depends	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  Socrates	  is	  white,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  proposition	  is	  true.	  But,	   as	   I	   said,	   truthmaking	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   case	   of	   grounding.	   Thus	   the	  considerations	  of	  the	  previous	  paragraph	  suggest	  that	  grounding	  should	  not	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  non-­‐causal	  relation	  of	  dependence.	  And	  yet	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  something	  right	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  grounding	  as	  a	  non-­‐causal	  relation	  of	  dependence.	  	  I	  think	  the	  way	  out	  of	  the	  dilemma	  is	  the	  following.	  Grounding	  is	  the	  non-­‐causal	   generic	   relation	   of	   being	   F	   in	   virtue	   of	   (or,	   equivalently,	   the	   generic	  relation	  of	  being	  F	  non-­‐causally	  in	  virtue	  of).	  Thus	  a	  relation	  is	  a	  case	  or	  species	  of	  grounding	   if	   it	   is	  a	  specification	  of	   the	  non-­‐causal	  generic	  relation	  of	  being	  F	   in	  
virtue	  of.	  Therefore	  truthmaking	  is	  a	  case	  or	  species	  of	  grounding,	  since	  it	  is	  the	  non-­‐causal	  relation	  of	  being	  true	  in	  virtue	  of:	  the	  proposition	  <Socrates	  is	  white>	  is	  true	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Socrates	  is	  white.	  Similarly,	  being	  right	  in	  virtue	  
of,	  being	  blue	  in	  virtue	  of,	  existing	  in	  virtue	  of,	  and	  many	  other	  such	  relations	  are	  also	  cases	  or	  species	  of	  grounding.	  	  	   Thus	  	  truthmaking	  is	  a	  species	  of	  grounding.	  But	  Kit	  Fine	  has	  argued	  that	  truthmaking	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  grounding,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  close	  cousins.	  One	  thing	  he	  says	  is	  that	  grounding,	  if	  a	  relation,	  should	  hold	  between	  entities	  of	  the	  same	  type	  and,	  insofar	  as	  a	  choice	  needs	  to	  be	  made,	  such	  entities	  should	  probably	  be	  facts	  rather	  than	  proposition	  (2012:	  43;	  Fine’s	  own	  view	  is	  that	  grounding	  is	  an	  operation	   rather	   than	   a	   relation).	   This	   excludes	   truthmaking	   as	   a	   case	   of	  grounding	   since	   the	   truthmaking	   relation	   links	   entities	   of	   different	   kinds	   to	  propositions.	  But	  no	  reason	  has	  been	  given	  why	  ground	  should	  only	  link	  entities	  of	   the	   same	   type.	   And,	   indeed,	   other	   grounding	   theorists	   take	   ground	   to	   link	  entities	  of	  different	  kinds	  (Schaffer	  2009:	  375).	  	  Fine	   objects	   to	   truthmaking	   in	   other	   ways	   too.	   For	   instance,	   he	   argues	  that	   truthmaking	   theory	   has	   an	   unduly	   restricted	   conception	   of	  what	   grounds	  and	  of	  what	  is	  grounded,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  the	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  procedure	  to	  determine	   what	   grounds	   what	   (2012:	   43–44).	   But	   these	   are	   objections	   to	   the	  project	  of	  letting	  truthmaking	  theory	  play	  all	  the	  roles	  associated	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  grounding.	  They	  are	  not	  objections	  to	  the	  more	  limited	  claim,	  which	  is	  my	  claim	  here,	   that	   truthmaking	   is	   a	   species	   of	   grounding.	   Fine	   also	   objects	   that	   the	  relation	   of	   truthmaking	   is	   defined	   in	   modal	   terms,	   i.e.	   as	   the	   relation	   of	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necessitation,	   and	   that	   this	  has,	   among	  others,	   the	  problem	   that	   any	  necessary	  truth	  will	   be	   grounded	   by	   anything	   (2012:	   45).	   But	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   define	  truthmaking	  as	  necessitation	  and,	   in	   fact,	   truthmaker	   theorists	  often	  define	   the	  truthmaking	  relation	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  true	  in	  virtue	  of,	  e.g.	  Armstrong	  2004:	  5,	  7,	  16–17,	   Rodriguez-­‐Pereyra	   2002:	   34,	   2005:	   17–18.	   Thus,	   although	   Fine	   is	   right	  that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  grounding	  than	  truthmaking,	  nothing	  he	  has	  said	  seems	  to	  undermine	  the	  idea	  that	  truthmaking	  is	  a	  species	  of	  grounding.	  	  	   Of	  course,	  some,	  Fine	  included,	  may	  reject	  my	  claim	  that	  truthmaking	  is	  a	  species	   of	   grounding	   by	   rejecting	  my	   general	   characterization	   of	   grounding	   as	  the	   non-­‐causal	   generic	   relation	   of	   being	   F	   in	   virtue	   of.	   They	   might	   think	   that	  grounding	  should	  be	  characterized	  as	  the	  relation	  of	  in	  virtue	  of,	  or	  as	  being	  F	  in	  
virtue	  of	  being	  G,	  or	  in	  some	  other	  way.	  But	  given	  the	  scope	  and	  plan	  of	  the	  paper	  I	   cannot	   engage	   in	   defending	   my	   general	   characterization	   of	   grounding.	   It	   is	  initially	  plausible	  that	  truthmaking	  is	  a	  species	  of	  grounding	  and	  all	  I	  can	  do	  here	  is	  to	  give	  reasons	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  but	  I	  cannot	  defend	  those	  reasons.	  For	  my	  aim	  is	   to	  argue	  that	  grounding	   is	  not	  a	  strict	  order,	  and	  I	  will	  do	  so	  by	  arguing	  that	   two	   species	   of	   grounding	   relations,	   one	   of	   which	   is	   truthmaking,	   fail	   to	  satisfy	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  strict	  order.	  Even	  those	  who	  think	  that	  truthmaking	  is	  not	   a	   species	   of	   grounding	   could	   still	   be	   persuaded	   by	  my	   argument	   that	   the	  other	  grounding	  relation	  is	  not	  a	  strict	  order	  and	  so	  that,	  in	  general,	  grounding	  is	  not	   a	   strict	   order	   (though	   I	   need	   the	   claim	   that	   truthmaking	   is	   a	   species	   of	  grounding	  to	  reach	  my	  conclusion	  that	  grounding	  is	  not	  transitive).	  	  	   What	  is	  the	  other	  relation	  I	  shall	  be	  discussing	  here?	  It	  is	  a	  close	  relative	  of	   truthmaking.	   Think	   of	   a	   truthmaker	   and	   the	   proposition	   it	   makes	   true.	  Because	  of	  the	  truthmaker,	  there	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  the	  proposition	  is	  true.	  And	  so	  the	  fact	   that	   the	   proposition	   is	   true	   exists,	   or	   obtains,	   in	   virtue	   of	   the	   truthmaker.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  proposition	  is	  true	  and	  the	  truthmaker	  stand	  in	  the	  non-­‐causal	  
exists	  (or	  obtains)	  in	  virtue	  of	  relation.	  Thus	  the	  truthmaker	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  the	   proposition	   is	   true.	   For	   instance,	   Socrates	   grounds	   the	   fact	   that	   <Socrates	  exists>	   is	   true,	   since	   the	   latter	   fact	   exists	   or	   obtains	   in	   virtue	   of	   Socrates.	  Similarly,	  the	  fact	  that	  Socrates	  is	  white	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  <Socrates	  is	  white>	  is	  true,	  since	  the	  latter	  fact	  exists	  or	  obtains	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Socrates	  is	  white.	  I	  shall	  call	  this	  relation,	  obtaining	  between	  a	  truthmaker	  and	  the	  fact	  that	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the	  proposition	  it	  truthmakes	  is	  true,	  the	  relation	  of	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding.	  (Note	  that	  taking	  these	  two	  relations	  as	  cases	  of	  grounding	  commits	  one	  to	  grounding	  not	  being	  a	  relation	  that	  obtains	  only	  between	  facts.	  This	  is	  controversial	  in	  the	  theory	   of	   grounding.	   There	   are	   those	  who	  maintain	   that	   grounding	   can	   obtain	  only	  between	  facts	  (e.g.	  Audi	  2012a	  and	  Rosen	  2010;	  cf.	  Fine	  2012:	  43)	  and	  those	  who	  maintain	  it	  can	  obtain	  between	  other	  entities	  too	  (e.g.	  Schaffer	  2009)).	  	   So	  both	  truthmaking	  and	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  are	  species	  of	  grounding.	  But	   for	   the	   genus	   to	   be	   a	   strict	   order	   is	   for	   all	   its	   species	   so	   to	   be.	   Thus	   by	  showing	  that	  neither	  truthmaking	  nor	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  are	  strict	  orders,	  I	  shall	  have	  shown	  that	  grounding	  is	  not	  a	  strict	  order	  either.	  	  Whenever	  an	  entity	  is	  a	  truthmaker	  of	  a	  certain	  proposition,	  that	  entity	  is	  the	  alethic-­‐fact	  ground	  of	   the	   fact	   that	   that	  proposition	   is	   true.	  The	  relations	  of	  truthmaking	  and	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  are	  thus	  closely	  linked.	  But	  this	  close	  link	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  must	  have	  the	  same	  formal	  properties.	  So	  the	  fact	  that	  truthmaking	  is	  neither	  transitive,	  nor	  irreflexive,	  nor	  asymmetric,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  has	  none	  of	   those	   three	   formal	  properties.	  Thus	  my	  examples	   that	   truthmaking	   is	   neither	   irreflexive	   nor	   asymmetric	   and	   my	  examples	  that	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  is	  neither	  irreflexive	  nor	  asymmetric	  will	  be	  independent	   from	   each	   other	   –	   although	   they	   will	   be	   similar.	   Furthermore,	  although	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  truthmaking	  is	  not	  transitive,	  I	  am	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  argue	   that	   alethic-­‐fact	   grounding	   is	   not	   transitive.	   But	   I	   shall	   first	   argue	   that	  Schaffer	  has	  not	  established	  that	  grounding	  is	  not	  a	  strict	  order	  since	  he	  has	  not	  established	  that	  grounding	  is	  not	  transitive.	  	  	  3.	  Schaffer	  has	  presented	  the	  following	  counterexample	  to	  transitivity.	  Consider	  the	   set	   S	   =	   {a,	   b,	   c}.	   Schaffer	   argues	   that	   (a)	   the	   fact	   that	   c	   is	   a	   member	   of	   S	  grounds	   the	   fact	   that	   S	   has	   exactly	   three	  members	   and	   (b)	   the	   fact	   that	   S	   has	  exactly	   three	  members	  grounds	   the	   fact	   that	  S	  has	   finitely	  many	  members,	  but	  (c)	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  c	  is	  a	  member	  of	  S	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  S	  has	  finitely	  many	  members	  (Schaffer	  2012:	  127–128).	  	  	   Schaffer	   supports	   (a)	  by	   saying	   that	   if	  c	  were	  not	  a	  member	  of	  S	   then	  S	  would	  have	  had	  two	  members	  and	  not	  three.	  Given	  that	  sets	  have	  their	  members	  necessarily,	  it	  is	  controversial	  that	  if	  S	  had	  not	  had	  c	  as	  a	  member,	  it	  would	  have	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had	  two	  members.	  But	  it	  is	  still	  plausible	  that	  if	  it	  had	  not	  had	  c	  as	  a	  member,	  it	  would	   not	   have	   had	   three	   members,	   since	   it	   would	   not	   have	   existed.	   Still,	  Schaffer’s	  reasoning	  treats	  the	  fact	  that	  something	  is	  counterfactually	  necessary	  for	  another	  fact	  as	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  of	  the	  former	  fact	  being	  a	  ground	  of	  the	  latter,	  where	  a	   fact	   [P]	   is	  counterfactually	  necessary	   for	  a	   fact	   [Q]	   if	  and	  only	   if	  had	  [P]	  not	  obtained,	  [Q]	  would	  not	  have	  obtained.	  	  This	   differs	   from	   Schaffer’s	   support	   for	   (c).	   For	   he	   says	   that	   (c)	   is	   true	  because	  S	  would	  have	  been	  finite	  even	  without	  c	  as	  a	  member.	  But,	   it	  might	  be	  objected,	  S	  would	  not	  have	  been	  finite	  without	  c	  as	  a	  member,	  since	  S	  would	  not	  have	   existed.	   This	   problem	   can	  be	   circumvented	  by	   changing	   the	   example	   and	  using	  a	  property	  that	  contingently	  has	  three	  instances	  (as	  noted	  by	  Litland	  2013:	  25–26).	  So	  I	  shall	   ignore	  this	  problem	  and	  continue	  using	  Schaffer’s	  example	  of	  set	  S.	   So,	  according	  to	  Schaffer,	  the	  fact	  that	  c	  is	  a	  member	  of	  S	  does	  not	  ground	  the	  fact	  that	  S	  has	  finitely	  many	  members	  because	  if	  c	  had	  not	  been	  a	  member	  of	  S,	  S	  would	  still	  have	  been	  finite.	  But	  this	  means	  that	  a	  fact	  being	  counterfactually	  necessary	  for	  another	  fact	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  the	  former	  grounding	  the	  latter.	  And	  given	  what	  he	  says	  about	  (a),	  that	  a	  fact	  is	  counterfactually	  necessary	  for	  another	  fact	  is	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  the	  former	  grounding	  the	  latter.	  But	  that	  a	  fact	  is	  counterfactually	  necessary	  for	  another	  fact	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	   for	   the	   former	   grounding	   the	   latter	   conflicts	  with	   (b),	   since	   the	   fact	  that	  S	  has	  exactly	   three	  members	   is	  not	   counterfactually	  necessary	   for	   the	   fact	  that	   S	   has	   finitely	  many	  members.	   But	   all	   Schaffer	   says	   about	   (b)	   is	   that	   it	   is	  plausible	   because	   having	   finitely	   many	   members	   is	   a	   determinable,	   of	   which	  having	  exactly	  three	  members	  is	  a	  determinate	  (2012:	  127).	  So	  perhaps	  the	  idea	  is	   that,	   provided	  property	  F	   is	  not	   a	  determinate	  of	  property	  G,	   if	   the	   fact	   that	  something	  is	  F	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  G,	  that	  it	  is	  F	  must	  be	  counterfactually	  necessary	  for	  its	  being	  G.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  the	  rationale	  for	  exempting	  the	  case	   of	   determinates	   and	   determinables	  would	   be.	   Furthermore,	   it	   seems	   that	  other	  exceptions	  will	  be	  needed	  since	  it	  is	  a	  standard	  idea	  that	  disjunctive	  facts	  are	   grounded	   in	   each	   of	   their	   true	   disjuncts,	   despite	   the	   latter	   often	  not	   being	  counterfactually	  necessary	  for	  the	  former.	  But	  then	  what	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  is	  why	  in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   facts	   that	   c	   is	   a	   member	   of	   S	   and	   that	   S	   has	   finitely	   many	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members,	   for	   the	   former	   to	   ground	   the	   latter,	   the	   former	   must	   be	  counterfactually	  necessary	  for	  the	  latter.	  	  Now,	  in	  private	  correspondence	  Schaffer	  has	  said	  that	  his	  intention	  was	  to	  use	   the	   counterfactual	   test	   not	   to	   establish	   his	   claims	   (a)	   and	   (c)	   but	   as	   a	  heuristic	   to	   buttress	   the	   intuitions	   that	   (a)	   and	   (c)	   are	   correct.	   But	   since	   no	  reason	  has	  been	  given	  for	  why	  the	  counterfactual	  test	  is	  a	  good	  heuristic	  in	  the	  cases	   in	   which	   it	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   a	   good	   heuristic,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   it	  buttresses	   any	   intuitions.	   Furthermore,	   this	   methodology	   seems	   impotent	   to	  convince	  anyone	  who	  does	  not	  share	  the	  initial	   intuitions.	  This	  is	  my	  own	  case.	  Indeed,	   I	   reject	   (a).	  For	   the	   identity	  of	   its	  members	  has	  nothing	   to	  do	  with	   the	  fact	   that	  S	  has	  exactly	   three	  of	   them	  –	  what	  grounds	  the	   fact	   that	  S	  has	  exactly	  three	  members	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   is	   something,	   something	   else,	   and	   a	   third	  thing	  such	  that	  none	  of	  them	  is	   identical	  with	  either	  of	   the	  others,	  all	   three	  are	  members	  of	  S,	  and	  nothing	  else	  is.5	  Schaffer	   produces	   two	   other	   counterexamples	   to	   the	   transitivity	   of	  grounding.	   One	   is	   the	   dented	   sphere	   case.	   But	   this	   case	   has	   exactly	   the	   same	  structure	  as	  the	  case	  of	  the	  three-­‐membered	  set	  S,	  and	  so	  what	  I	  said	  about	  the	  latter	  applies	  to	  the	  former.	  The	  other	  case	  is	  that	  of	  Cadmus’	  meow.	  According	  to	  Schaffer,	  (d)	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  creature	  was	  produced	  from	  the	  meeting	  of	  this	  sperm	  and	  that	  ovum	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  Cadmus	  is	  meowing	  and	  (e)	  the	  fact	  that	  Cadmus	  is	  meowing	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  something	  is	  meowing,	  but	  (f)	  the	  fact	   that	   the	   creature	   was	   produced	   from	   the	  meeting	   of	   this	   sperm	   and	   that	  ovum	  does	  not	  ground	  the	  fact	  that	  something	  is	  meowing.	  Given	  what	  Schaffer	  says	  about	   (d),	   (e),	  and	  (f),	   it	   is	  not	  clear	   that	   this	  case	   is	   intended	   to	  have	   the	  same	  structure	  as	  the	  other	  two.	  	  I	   think	   this	   example	   is	   not	   a	   failure	   of	   transitivity.	   In	   defense	   of	   (d)	  Schaffer	   says	   that,	   given	   origin	   essentialism,	   (d)	   is	   plausible,	   since	   being	  produced	  from	  the	  meeting	  of	  this	  sperm	  and	  that	  ovum	  helps	  make	  the	  creature	  Cadmus	  as	  opposed	  to	  some	  other	  cat.	  If	  one	  wonders	  why	  Cadmus	  is	  meowing,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  In	  private	  correspondence	  Schaffer	  has	  noted	  that	  what	  grounds	  the	  existential	  generalization	  that	   there	   is	   something	   that	   is	   a	   member	   of	   S	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   c	   is	   a	   member	   of	   S	   and	   that,	  therefore,	   the	   believer	   in	   transitivity	   will	   nevertheless	   have	   to	   admit	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   c	   is	   a	  member	  of	  S	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  S	  has	  exactly	  three	  members.	  This	  is	  a	  nice	  point,	  and	  it	  means	  that	  the	  defender	  of	  the	  transitivity	  of	  grounding	  cannot	  reject	  (a)	  on	  the	  basis	  I	  have	  proposed.	  But	  since	  I	  do	  not	  accept	  the	  transitivity	  of	  grounding,	  I	  can	  reject	  (a)	  on	  that	  basis.	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Schaffer	  says,	  the	  facts	  that	  make	  the	  meowing	  creature	  Cadmus	  are	  part	  of	  the	  reason	   (2012:	   128).	   So	   the	   grounded	   fact	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  Cadmus	   is	  meowing.	  This	   is	  not	   the	   fact	   that	  Cadmus	   is	  meowing,	   since	   this	   fact	   is	  not	  grounded	  by	  what	   makes	   the	   creature	   Cadmus	   –	   what	   makes	   the	   creature	   Cadmus	   has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  meowing.	  	  And	   Schaffer	   says	   that	   (e)	   is	   plausible	   since	   the	   fact	   that	   Cadmus	   is	  meowing	   provides	   a	   factual	   witness	   for	   the	   existential	   generalization	   that	  something	  is	  meowing,	  and	  factual	  witnesses	  ground	  existential	  generalizations.	  If	  one	  wonders	  why	  something	  is	  meowing,	  Schaffer	  says,	  the	  fact	  that	  Cadmus	  is	  meowing	  provides	  a	  sufficient	  reason	  (2012:	  128).	  	  Note	   that	  given	  his	   commitments	   in	   the	  case	  of	   set	  S,	   Schaffer	  will	  have	  some	   explaining	   to	   do	   concerning	   why	   (e)	   is	   acceptable,	   since	   the	   fact	   that	  Cadmus	  is	  meowing	  is	  not	  counterfactually	  necessary	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  something	  is	  meowing.	  But,	  independently	  of	  this,	  what	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  something	  is	  meowing	   is	   not	   that	   Cadmus	   is	   meowing	   but	   that	   Cadmus	   is	   meowing.	   That	  
Cadmus	   is	  meowing	  grounds	   the	   fact	   that	  Cadmus	   is	  doing	  something,	  not	   that	  something	   is	   meowing.	   That	   in	   virtue	   of	   which	   something	   is	   meowing	   is	   that	  Cadmus	   is	  meowing,	   not	   that	  Cadmus	   is	  meowing.	  And	  so	   there	   is	  no	   failure	  of	  transitivity	  in	  this	  case	  since	  the	  grounded	  in	  (d)	  is	  not	  the	  grounding	  in	  (e).	  	  This	  presupposes	  that	  the	  facts	  that	  Cadmus	  is	  meowing	  and	  that	  Cadmus	  is	  meowing	   are	   different	   facts,	   and	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   exactly	   what	   the	   difference	  between	   them	   consists	   in.	   But	   that	   these	   facts	   are	   different	   is	   presupposed	  by	  what	  Schaffer	  says.	  For	  instance,	  in	  defense	  of	  (f)	  Schaffer	  says	  ‘the	  fact	  that	  the	  creature	   was	   produced	   from	   the	   meeting	   of	   this	   sperm	   and	   that	   ovum	   helps	  make	   it	   be	   Cadmus	   meowing,	   but	   doesn’t	   help	   make	   it	   be	   Cadmus	  meowing’	  (2012:	   129).	   And	   for	  my	   purposes	   here	   I	   do	   not	   need	   to	   clarify	   the	   difference	  between	   these	   facts.	   For,	  whatever	   the	   difference	   between	   these	   facts	   is,	  what	  Schaffer	  says	  suggests	  that	  the	  two	  facts	  are	  different.	  Furthermore,	  for	  (f)	  to	  be	  plausible,	   the	  grounded	   in	   (d)	  must	  be	   the	   fact	   that	  Cadmus	   is	  meowing,	  while	  the	  grounding	  in	  (e)	  must	  be	  the	  fact	  that	  Cadmus	  is	  meowing.	  And	  if	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  the	  present	  case	  is	  not	  a	  counterexample	  to	  the	  transitivity	  of	  grounding.	  	  Thus	   Schaffer’s	   case	   does	   not	   establish	   that	   grounding	   is	   not	   transitive.	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4.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  truthmaking	  is	  not	  transitive.	  Consider	  (1)	  and	  (2):	  	  (1)	  The	  fact	  that	  Socrates	  is	  white	  makes	  <Socrates	  is	  white>	  true.	  	  (2)	  <Socrates	  is	  white>	  makes	  <There	  are	  propositions>	  true.	  	  (1)	  is	  plausible	  for	  truthmaker	  theorists.	  And	  so	  is	  (2).	  For	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  the	  truthmakers	  for	  an	  existential	  generalization	  are	  its	  instances	  if	  those	  instances	  are	   necessarily	   its	   instances.	   But	   it	   is	   also	   plausible	   that	   propositions	   are	  necessarily	   propositions.	   Thus	   any	   proposition	   is	   a	   truthmaker	   for	   <There	   are	  propositions>.	  	  Now,	  transitivity	  would	  give	  us	  (3):	  	  (3)	  The	  fact	  that	  Socrates	  is	  white	  makes	  <There	  are	  propositions>	  true.	  	  But	  (3)	  is	  false.	  The	  proposition	  <There	  are	  propositions>	  is	  not	  true	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	   fact	   that	   Socrates	   is	  white.	   Although	   the	   fact	   that	   Socrates	   is	  white	  makes	  true	  a	  truthmaker	  of	  <There	  are	  propositions>,	  the	  fact	  that	  Socrates	  is	  white	  is	  not	  that	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  <There	  are	  propositions>	  is	  true.	  Indeed,	  the	  fact	  that	  Socrates	   is	  white	   is	  not	  even	   that	   in	  virtue	  of	  which	  <Socrates	   is	  white>	  exists,	  and	   so	   one	   should	   not	   expect	   it	   to	   be	   that	   in	   virtue	   of	   which	   <There	   are	  propositions>	  is	  true.	  Only	  that	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  propositions	  exist	  can	  be	  the	  truthmaker	  of	  <There	  are	  propositions>.	  Thus	  (3)	  is	  false,	  and	  transitivity	  fails.6	  	  Raven	   says	   that	   truthmaking	   cannot	   be	   a	   species	   of	   grounding	   because	  the	   relata	   of	   truthmaking	   are	   of	   different	   types	   and	   this	   precludes	   chaining	  (Raven	  2013:	  194;	  cf.	  Fine	  2012:	  44–45).	  But	  not	  all	  the	  relata	  of	  a	  truthmaking	  relation	  are	  of	  different	  types,	  as	  this	  example	  illustrates.	  A	  proposition	  can	  both	  be	  made	  true	  and	  make	  true	  another	  proposition.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  with	  <Socrates	  is	  white>	  in	  the	  present	  example.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   After	  writing	   and	   submitting	   this	   paper	   I	   learnt,	   through	   a	   referee,	   of	   Aaron	  Griffith’s	   paper,	  where	   he	   presents	   a	   counterexample	   to	   the	   transitivity	   of	   truthmaking	   very	   similar	   to	   mine	  (Griffith	  2014:	  205).	  He	  also	  denies	   the	   irreflexivity	  and	  asymmetry	  of	   truthmaking,	   though	  his	  examples	   for	   this	   claim	   are	   different	   from	   mine.	   More	   importantly,	   he	   seems	   to	   think	   that	  grounding	  is	  irreflexive,	  asymmetric	  and	  transitive	  (2014:	  205).	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Is	  the	  alethic-­‐fact	  relation	  non-­‐transitive?	  I	  am	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  argue	  for	  such	  a	  claim.	  Consider,	  for	  instance,	  the	  following	  three	  claims:	  	  (4)	  The	   fact	   that	   Socrates	   is	  white	   grounds	   the	   fact	   that	  <Socrates	   is	  white>	   is	  true.	  	  (5)	   The	   fact	   that	   <Socrates	   is	  white>	   is	   true	   grounds	   the	   fact	   that	   <There	   are	  propositions>	  is	  true.	  	  (6)	   It	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   Socrates	   is	  white	   grounds	   the	   fact	   that	  <There	  are	  propositions>	  is	  true.	  	  	  These	  three	  claims	  do	  not	  show	  that	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  is	  non-­‐transitive,	  for	  although	  (4)	  and	  (6)	  are	  true,	  (5)	  is	  false.	  What	  <There	  are	  propositions>	  is	  true	  in	  virtue	  of	  is	  not	  the	  fact	  that	  <Socrates	  is	  white>	  is	  true,	  but	  rather	  the	  fact	  that	  <Socrates	  is	  white>	  exists.	  	  One	  might	   then	   think	   that	   the	   following	   three	   claims	   show	   that	   alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  is	  non-­‐transitive:	  	  (4)	  The	   fact	   that	   Socrates	   is	  white	   grounds	   the	   fact	   that	  <Socrates	   is	  white>	   is	  true.	  	  (7)	  The	  fact	  that	  <Socrates	  is	  white>	  is	  true	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  <There	  are	  true	  propositions>	  is	  true.	  	  	  (8)	   It	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   Socrates	   is	  white	   grounds	   the	   fact	   that	  <There	  are	  true	  propositions>	  is	  true.	  	  	  But	  these	  three	  claims	  do	  not	  show	  that	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  is	  non-­‐transitive.	  For	  although	  both	  (4)	  and	  (7)	  are	  true,	  I	  see	  no	  reason	  to	  accept	  (8)	  that	  does	  not	  assume	  that	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  is	  non-­‐transitive.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Points	  made	  by	  Nick	   Jones	  and	  Ezequiel	  Zerbudis	  made	  me	  see	   that	   I	  am	  not	   in	  a	  position	   to	  argue	   that	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	   is	  non-­‐transitive	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  example	  based	  on	  claims	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But	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  (1)-­‐(3)	  show	  that	  truthmaking	  is	  not	  transitive,	  and	  so	  truthmaking	   is	  not	  a	  strict	  order.	  And	  this	   is	  enough	  to	  show	  that	  grounding	   is	  not	  transitive,	  and	  so	  not	  a	  strict	  order	  either.	  But	  there	  are	  other	  reasons	  why	  truthmaking	  is	  not	  a	  strict	  order:	  it	  is	  neither	  irreflexive	  nor	  asymmetric,	  as	  we	  shall	  now	  see.	  Thus	  grounding	  is	  also	  neither	  irreflexive	  nor	  asymmetric,	  as	  we	  shall	  now	  see.	  	  	  5.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   shall	   argue	   that	   grounding	   is	   not	   irreflexive.	   Consider	   the	  proposition	   A:	   <A	   exists>.	   This	   proposition	   says	   of	   itself	   that	   it	   exists.	   Let	   us	  suppose	  that	  A	  exists.	  If	  so,	  A	  is	  true.	  What	  makes	  it	  true?	  According	  to	  standard	  truthmaking	  ideas,	  a	  proposition	  of	  the	  form	  <e	  exists>	  is	  made	  true	  by	  e	   itself.	  Thus,	  if	  it	  exists,	  A	  is	  made	  true	  by	  itself.	  Thus	  truthmaking	  is	  not	  irreflexive,	  and	  therefore	  neither	  is	  grounding.	  	  But	  there	  is	  another	  reason	  why	  grounding	  is	  not	  irreflexive,	  since	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  also	  fails	  irreflexivity.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  the	  truth-­‐teller,	  B:	  <B	  is	   true>.	   This	   proposition	   says	   of	   itself	   that	   it	   is	   true.	   Let	   us	   suppose	   that	  B	   is	  indeed	  true.	  What	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  true?	  The	  fact	  stated	  by	  B	  itself.	  But	  what	   B	   states	   is	   that	   it	   itself	   is	   true.	   Thus,	   if	   B	   is	   true,	   the	   fact	   that	   B	   is	   true	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  true.	  Therefore,	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  is	  not	  irreflexive.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4),	   (7),	   and	   (8).	   Tuomas	   Tahko	   (2013)	   argues	   that	   what	   he	   calls	   truth-­‐grounding	   is	   not	  transitive,	   and	   what	   he	   calls	   truth-­‐grounding	   seems	   to	   be	   what	   I	   am	   calling	   here	   alethic-­‐fact	  grounding.	  Simplifying	  a	  little	  bit,	  he	  argues	  that	  while	  the	  fact	  that	  bottle	  b	  exists	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  b	  has	  a	  stable	  macrophysical	  structure,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  b	  has	  a	  stable	  macrophysical	  structure	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Pauli	  Exclusion	  Principle	  holds,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  b	  exists	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Pauli	  Exclusion	  principle	  holds	  (2013:	  336–337).	  The	   problem	   with	   this	   is	   that	   it	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   counterexemplify	   the	   transitivity	   of	   truth-­‐grounding	  in	  particular,	  since	  no	  fact	  involved	  in	  this	  case	  is	  a	  fact	  about	  something’s	  being	  true.	  But	  I	  do	  not	  think	  the	  example	  even	  works	  against	  the	  transitivity	  of	  grounding	  in	  general.	  Tahko	  thinks	   that	   general	   laws	   like	   the	   Pauli	   Exclusion	   Principle	   in	   no	   way	   contribute	   towards	  answering	  the	  question	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  bottle	  b	  (2013:	  337).	  But	  if	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Pauli	  Exclusion	  principle	  holds	  grounds	  the	  fact	   that	  b	  has	  a	  stable	  macrophysical	  structure,	  and	  this	  latter	   fact	   grounds	   the	   fact	   that	   b	   exists,	   then	   I	   see	   no	   reason,	   other	   than	   assuming	   that	  transitivity	  must	  fail,	  why	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Pauli	  Exclusion	  Principle	  holds	  should	  not	  ground	  the	  fact	  that	  bottle	  b	  exists	  or	  even	  the	  fact	  that	  <bottle	  b	  exists>	  is	  true.	  One	  might	  try	  reformulating	  the	  example	  as	  follows:	  the	  fact	  that	  <b	  has	  a	  stable	  macrophysical	  structure>	  is	  true	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  <b	  exists>	  is	  true,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Pauli	  Exclusion	  Principle	  holds	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  <b	  has	  a	  stable	  macrophysical	  structure>	  is	  true,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Pauli	  Exclusion	  Principle	  holds	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  <b	  exists>	  is	  true.	  But	  this	  reformulation	  has	  the	  additional	  problem	  that	  the	  first	  claim,	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  <b	  has	  a	  stable	  macrophysical	  structure>	  is	   true	   grounds	   the	   fact	   that	   <b	   exists>	   is	   true,	   seems	   incorrect:	  what	   grounds	   the	   truth	   of	   <b	  exists>	  is,	  in	  any	  case,	  something	  about	  b,	  say	  that	  it	  has	  a	  stable	  macrophysical	  structure,	  but	  not	  something	  about	  the	  truth	  of	  another	  proposition.	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And	   since	   alethic-­‐fact	   grounding	   is	   a	   species	   of	   grounding,	   grounding	   is	   not	  irreflexive.8	  (Note	  that	  if	  A	  is	  its	  own	  truthmaker,	  it	  is	  its	  only	  truthmaker,	  and	  if	  the	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  true	  is	  grounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  true,	  the	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  true	  is	  its	  sole	  ground.	  This	  means	  that	  A	  is	  its	  own	  full	  ground	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  true	  is	  its	  own	  full	  ground).9	  Kripke	   has	   proposed	   a	   theory	   of	   truth	   in	   which	   the	   concept	   of	  groundedness	   plays	   a	   central	   role.	   The	   truthbearers	   in	   Kripke’s	   theory	   are	  sentences.	   On	   Kripke’s	   theory,	   the	   truth-­‐teller,	   the	   sentence	   that	   says	   of	   itself	  that	  it	   is	  true,	   is	  ungrounded	  (Kripke:	  2011:	  85,	  91).	  Thus	  what	  I	  am	  proposing	  here	  seems	  to	  conflict	  with	  Kripke’s	  theory	  of	  truth.	  	  But	   it	   is	   important	   to	   appreciate	   the	   real	   point	   of	   conflict.	   On	   Kripke’s	  theory	  that	  a	  sentence	  is	  ungrounded	  basically	  means	  that	  its	  truth-­‐value	  is	  not	  ultimately	  determined	  by	  non-­‐semantic	  facts	  (Kripke	  2011:	  88).	  The	  motivation	  of	   Kripke’s	   theory	   is	   to	   give	   an	   explanation	   of	   truth	   that	   avoids	   the	   semantic	  paradoxes,	   and	   he	   does	   this	   in	   a	   way	   that	   accounts	   for	   how	   someone	   who	  initially	   does	   not	   understand	   the	   truth	   predicate,	   but	   who	   understands	   other	  non-­‐semantic	  predicates,	  would	   learn	   to	  use	   the	   truth	  predicate	   (2011:	  85).	  At	  the	   base	   of	   Kripke’s	   construction	   there	   are	   sentences	   featuring	   only	   non-­‐semantic	  predicates.	  The	  assignment	  of	  truth-­‐values	  to	  sentences	  featuring	  non-­‐semantic	  predicates	  determines	  a	  minimal	  fixed	  point	  in	  which	  the	  truth	  value	  of	  sentences	   featuring	   semantic	   predicates	   is	   ultimately	   determined	   by	   the	   truth	  value	  of	  sentences	  featuring	  only	  non-­‐semantic	  predicates.	  The	  sentences	  that	  do	  not	   have	   a	   truth-­‐value	   in	   the	   minimal	   fixed	   points	   are	   ungrounded.	   Thus	   for	  Kripke	  ‘ungrounded	  sentence’	  means	  ‘sentence	  not	  ultimately	  grounded	  in	  non-­‐semantic	  facts’.	  But,	   as	   Kripke	   is	   of	   course	   aware,	   the	   truth-­‐teller	   is	   not	   a	   paradoxical	  sentence.	  The	  truth-­‐teller	  can	  consistently	  be	  assigned	  the	  truth-­‐value	  true,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	   Fine	   (2010:	   104–105)	   says	   that	   there	   might	   be	   special	   cases	   in	   which	   something,	   in	   one	  capacity,	  is	  a	  ground	  for	  itself	  in	  another	  capacity,	  and	  that	  the	  truth-­‐teller	  might	  in	  this	  sense	  be	  a	  ground	   for	   itself.	  Unfortunately	  he	  does	  not	  explain	  how	  the	   truth	   teller,	   in	  one	  capacity,	   can	  ground	   itself	   in	   another	   capacity.	   But,	  whatever	   grounding	   in	   one	   capacity	  might	  mean,	   in	  my	  example	  the	  truth-­‐teller	  grounds	  itself	  in	  one	  and	  the	  same	  capacity.	  	  9	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  my	  counterexamples	  to	  the	  irreflexivity	  of	  grounding	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  its	  transitivity,	  which	  I	  have	  anyway	  rejected	  in	  the	  case	  of	  truthmaking.	  This	  distinguishes	  my	  counterexamples	  from	  Correia’s,	  which	  assume	  the	  transitivity	  of	  grounding	  (Correia	  2014:	  54–55).	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Kripke’s	   theory	   allows	   for	   this	   –	   the	   truth-­‐teller	   has	   a	   truth-­‐value	   in	   every	  maximal	   fixed	   point	   (2011:	   91–92).	   But	   since	   in	   those	   cases	   the	   truth	   of	   the	  truth-­‐teller	  is	  not	  determined	  by	  non-­‐semantic	  facts	  at	  all,	  the	  truth-­‐teller	  counts	  as	  a	  truth	  but	  an	  ungrounded	  truth	  (2011:	  91-­‐92).	  Translated	   into	  my	   schema	   of	   propositions	   and	   facts	   about	   their	   being	  true,	  this	  becomes	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  proposition	  is	  ungrounded	  only	  if	  the	  fact	  that	  it	   is	   true	   is	  not	  ultimately	  determined	  by	  non-­‐semantic	   facts.	  Now,	   in	   so	   far	   as	  Kripke	   would	  maintain	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   B	   is	   true	   is	   not	   determined	   by	   non-­‐semantic	  facts	  at	  all,	  I	  am	  not	  in	  conflict	  with	  him,	  since	  I	  maintain	  that	  the	  fact	  that	   B	   is	   true	   is	   not	   determined	   by	   non-­‐semantic	   facts	   at	   all.	   But	   in	   so	   far	   as	  Kripke	   seems	   to	  maintain	   that	   the	   semantic	   can	   only	   be	   grounded	   in	   the	   non-­‐semantic,	   I	   disagree.	   I	   can	   see	   no	   reason	   why	   semantic	   facts,	   e.g.	   facts	   that	   a	  certain	  proposition	   is	   true,	  must	  be	  ultimately	  grounded	   in	  non-­‐semantic	   facts.	  And,	  indeed,	  the	  example	  of	  proposition	  B	  convinces	  me	  that	  there	  are	  semantic	  facts	   ultimately	   grounded	   in	   semantic	   facts.	   Furthermore,	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  semantic	   can	   only	   be	   grounded	   in	   the	   non-­‐semantic	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   be	  essential	   to	   Kripke’s	   solution	   of	   the	   paradoxes.	   What	   is	   essential	   for	   that	   is	  simply	   that	   the	   truth	   value	   of	   certain	   sentences	   is	   not	   determined	   by	   non-­‐semantic	   facts	  at	   all.	  And	   this	   is	   independent	  of	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   semantic	   can	  only	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  non-­‐semantic.	  Note,	  by	   the	  way,	   that	  my	  case	   that	  proposition	  A	   is	  made	   true	  by	   itself	  does	   not	   presuppose	   that	   semantic	   facts	   can	   be	   ultimate	   grounds.	   For	  proposition	  A	  is	  a	  proposition,	  not	  a	  fact,	  and	  therefore	  not	  a	  semantic	  fact.	  Nor	  is	  the	   fact	   that	  proposition	  A	  exists	  a	  semantic	   fact,	   since	  a	  semantic	   fact	   is	  a	   fact	  about	  whether	   a	   certain	   proposition	   is	   true	   or	   not.	   So	   even	   those	  who	  believe	  that	   semantic	   facts	   cannot	   be	   ultimate	   grounds	   will	   have	   reason	   to	   reject	   the	  irreflexivity	  of	  truthmaking	  and	  therefore	  that	  of	  grounding	  too.	  	  Now,	   proposition	   B	   can	   consistently	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   true,	   it	   can	  consistently	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   false,	   and	   it	   can	   consistently	   be	   thought	   of	   as	  indeterminate;	   and	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   about	  which	   one	   it	   is.	   So,	   it	  might	   be	  objected,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	   proposition	   B	   is	   true,	   and	   therefore	   no	  evidence	  has	  been	  presented	  that	  grounding	  is	  not	  irreflexive.	  But	  this	  objection	  wrongly	   assumes	   that	   the	   relevant	   target	   is	   the	   thesis	   that	   there	   are	  no	   actual	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instances	   of	   reflexive	   grounding,	   i.e.	   no	   actual	   instances	   of	   entities	   grounding	  themselves.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  thesis	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  refute.	  The	  thesis	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  refute	  is	  that	  it	  is	  conceptually	  necessary,	  or	  at	  least	  metaphysically	  necessary,	  that	  grounding	  is	  irreflexive.	  That	  is	  what	  those	  who	  maintain	  the	  irreflexivity	  of	  grounding	  maintain.	  And,	  in	  any	  case,	  that	  it	  is	  conceptually	  necessary,	  or	  at	  least	  metaphysically	  necessary,	  that	  grounding	  is	   irreflexive	  is	  what	  defenders	  of	  the	  irreflexivity	  of	  grounding	  should	  maintain.	  For	  when	  postulating	  that	  grounding	  is	   irreflexive	   (or	   asymmetric,	   or	   transitive)	   they	   are	   concerned	  with	   the	  most	  general	   and	  abstract	   formal	   features	  of	   grounding,	  not	  with	  aspects	   that	  might	  but	  need	  not	  be	  true	  of	  it.	  But	  if,	  under	  the	  non-­‐contradictory	  assumption	  that	  B	  is	  true,	  it	   is	  shown	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  true	  would	  ground	  itself,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  conceptually	   true	   that	   alethic-­‐fact	   grounding	   is	   irreflexive.	   And	   therefore	   the	  thesis	  that	  grounding	  is	  irreflexive,	  in	  the	  intended	  sense,	  has	  been	  refuted.	  A	  similar	  point	  can	  be	  made	  about	  proposition	  A.	  For	  given	  that	  under	  the	  non-­‐contradictory	   assumption	   that	   A	   exists,	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   A	  would	   be	   its	  own	  truthmaker,	  and	  so	  its	  own	  ground,	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  it	  is	  not	  conceptually	  true	  that	  grounding	  is	  irreflexive.	  	  It	   might	   be	   claimed	   that	   although	   it	   is	   not	   conceptually	   necessary	   that	  alethic-­‐fact	   grounding	   and	   truthmaking	   are	   irreflexive,	   it	   is	   metaphysically	  necessary	  that	  this	  is	  so.	  One	  way	  for	  this	  to	  happen	  is	  for	  it	  to	  be	  metaphysically	  necessary	   that	   if	   A	   exists,	   it	   is	   not	   its	   own	   truthmaker;	   or	   for	   it	   to	   be	  metaphysically	  necessary	  that	  if	  B	  is	  true,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  true	  is	  not	  grounded	  in	  itself.	  	  Now,	   given	   that	   propositions	   of	   the	   form	  <e	   exists>	   are	  made	   true	  by	  e	  itself,	   it	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   see	   how	   A	   could	   exist	  without	   being	  made	   true	   by	  itself.	  Similarly,	  given	  that	  propositions	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  facts	  stated	  by	  them,	  it	   is	  very	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  the	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  true	  could	  fail	  to	  be	  grounded	  in	  itself.	  	   So	  perhaps	   it	   is	  necessary	  that	  A	  does	  not	  exist?	  But	  why	  should	  this	  be	  the	  case?	  There	  is	  certainly	  no	  contradiction	  in	  its	  existence.	  And	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  other	  self-­‐referring	  objects.	   Indeed,	  there	  are	  some	  objects	  very	  similar	  to	  A.	  Consider	  this	  token	  sentence	  S:	  S	  does	  not	  exist.	  S	  does	  exist	  –	  it	  is	  located	  on	  this	  page.	  So	  why	  couldn’t	  proposition	  A	  exist?	  What	  does	  not	  exist	  is	  the	  case	  for	  the	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necessary	  non-­‐existence	  of	  A.	  Depending	  on	  one’s	  metaphysics	  of	  propositions,	  one	  might	  have	  doubts	  about	   the	   existence	   of	   propositions	   like	   A.	   For	   instance,	   if	   propositions	   are	  broadly	  Russellian	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  complex	  objects	  containing	  the	  objects	  they	  are	  about,	  proposition	  A	  would	  contain	   itself	  as	  a	  proper	  constituent.	  This	  need	  not	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  rejecting	  self-­‐referential	  propositions	  though,	  since	  the	  notion	  of	  something	  being	  a	  proper	  constituent	  of	  itself	  need	  not	  be	  absurd.	  But	  even	  if	   it	   is,	  there	  are	  other	  conceptions	  of	  propositions	  in	  which	  proposition	  A	  would	  not	  be	  a	  proper	  constituent	  of	  itself.	  Furthermore,	  the	  truthmaker	  theorist	  is	   unlikely	   to	   adopt	   any	   Russellian	   view	   of	   propositions,	   since	   these	   are	   too	  similar	   to	   facts,	  and	  he	  needs	   to	  maintain	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	   facts	  and	  propositions.	  How	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  true?	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  B	  is	  untrue?	  It	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  so	  because	  it	  is	  metaphysically	  necessary	  that	  truths	  are	  ultimately	  determined	  by	  non-­‐semantic	  facts.	  Since	  the	  truth	  of	  B	  cannot	  be	  determined	  by	  non-­‐semantic	  facts,	  then	  B	  cannot	  be	  true,	  and	  so	  the	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  true	  cannot	  exist.	  	  But	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  namely	  that	  if	  it	  is	  correct,	  there	  must	  be	  truths	  that	  are	  not	  ultimately	  grounded	  in	  non-­‐semantic	  facts.	  For	  suppose	  that	  B	  is	  untrue	  because	  it	   is	  not	  ultimately	  grounded	  in	  non-­‐semantic	  facts.	  Consider	   then	   the	  proposition	  B*:	  <B	   is	  untrue>.	  B*	   is	   true,	   since,	  we	  are	  assuming,	  B	   is	  untrue.	  But	  the	  truth	  of	  B*	   is	  not	  ultimately	  determined	  by	  non-­‐semantic	  facts:	  it	  is,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  ultimately	  determined	  by	  the	  semantic	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  untrue.	  	  Thus,	   there	   is	   not	   much	   prospect	   in	   arguing	   that	   although	   it	   is	   not	  conceptually	   necessary	   that	   grounding	   is	   irreflexive,	   it	   is	   metaphysically	  necessary	  that	  this	  is	  so.	  It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	  my	   counterexamples	   to	   the	   irreflexivity	   of	  grounding	   and	   truthmaking	   share	   an	   important	   feature	   that	   not	   every	   other	  potential	   counterexample	   shares.	   The	   potential	   counterexample	   to	   the	  irreflexivity	  of	  grounding	   Jenkins	   considers	   is	   that	  of	  a	  pain	  being	  grounded	   in	  itself,	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   being	   grounded	   in	   a	   brain	   state	   to	   which	   it	   is	   identical	  (Jenkins	  2011:	  271).	  This	  depends	  on	  a	  controversial	  metaphysics	  of	  mind.	  But	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there	  is	  another	  reason	  why	  this	  example	  is	  controversial.	  The	  idea	  that	  mental	  states	   are	   grounded	   in	   brain	   states	   is	  motivated	  by	   an	   interest	   in	   relating	   two	  
distinct	   sets	   of	   states.	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	  why	   an	   identity	   theorist	   should	   feel	  inclined	   to	   maintain	   that	   mental	   states	   are	   grounded	   in	   brain	   states.	   But	  truthmaker	   theory	   is	   committed	   to	   the	   claim	   that	  a	  proposition	  of	   the	   form	  <e	  exists>	  is	  made	  true	  by	  e,	  and	  so	  it	  entails	  that	  if	  proposition	  A	  exists,	  it	  is	  made	  true	   by	   itself.	   Similarly,	   the	   theory	   of	   grounding	   maintains	   that	   a	   fact	   that	   a	  certain	  proposition	  is	  true	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  fact	  stated	  by	  that	  proposition,	  and	  so	   it	   entails	   that	   if	   proposition	  B	   is	   true,	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   true	   is	   grounded	   in	  itself.	  	  	  6.	   If	   truthmaking	   and	   alethic-­‐fact	   grounding	   are	   asymmetric,	   they	   must	   be	  irreflexive.	   Their	   non-­‐irreflexivity,	   however,	   guarantees	   their	   non-­‐asymmetry	  only	   by	   guaranteeing	   that	   cases	   of	   symmetric	   truthmaking	   and	   alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	   are	   cases	  of	   reflexive	   truthmaking	   and	  alethic-­‐fact	   grounding.	  But	   if	  what	  I	  have	  said	  above	  is	  accepted,	  it	  will	  not	  be	  difficult	  to	  see	  that	  truthmaking	  and	   grounding	   are	   non-­‐asymmetric	   in	   the	   full	   sense	   of	   there	   being	   distinct	  entities	  that	  ground	  each	  other.	  	  Consider	  the	  propositions	  C	  =	  <D	  exists>	  and	  D	  =	  <C	  exists>,	  and	  assume	  that	  both	  of	  them	  exist.	  The	  truthmaker	  of	  C	  is	  D,	  and	  the	  truthmaker	  of	  D	  is	  C.	  Therefore	  truthmaking	  is	  not	  asymmetric,	  and	  so	  neither	  is	  grounding.	  	  Now	  consider	   the	  propositions	  E	  =	  <F	   is	   true>	  and	  F	  =	  <E	   is	   true>,	   and	  assume	   they	   are	   both	   true.	   If	   so,	   given	   what	   they	   say,	   the	   fact	   that	   E	   is	   true	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  F	  is	  true,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  F	  is	  true	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  E	  is	  true.10	   Therefore,	   alethic-­‐fact	   grounding	   is	   not	   asymmetric,	   and	   so	   neither	   is	  grounding.	  	  But	   there	   is	   a	   natural	   objection	   to	   this.	   This	   is	   that	   grounding	  must	   be	  asymmetric	   because	   the	   ground	   is	   more	   fundamental	   than	   the	   grounded,	   and	  
being	   more	   fundamental	   than	   is	   an	   asymmetric	   relation	   (cf.	   Rosen	   2010:	   116,	  Barnes	  2014,	  Bennett	  forthcoming).	  The	  same	  kind	  of	  consideration	  can	  be	  used	  to	  argue	  that	  grounding	  must	  be	  irreflexive,	  since	  being	  more	  fundamental	  than	  is	  an	  irreflexive	  relation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Thompson	  (2014)	  has	  given	  a	  similar	  example.	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Now,	  the	  relations	  of	  grounding	  and	  being	  more	  fundamental	  than	  are	  not	  the	  same	  relation.	  For	  something	  might	  be	  more	  fundamental	  than	  another	  thing	  without	   grounding	   it.	   This	  will	   be	   the	   case,	   for	   instance,	   if	   the	   former	   thing	   is	  fundamental	   and	   the	   latter	   one	   is	   grounded,	   but	   grounded	   in	   something	   other	  than	   the	   former	   thing.	   But	   the	   point	   that	   grounding	   must	   be	   irreflexive	   and	  asymmetric	  need	  not	  rely	  on	  an	  identification	  of	  the	  relations	  of	  grounding	  and	  
being	  more	  fundamental	  than	  but	  only	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  x	  grounds	  y,	  x	  must	  be	  more	  fundamental	  than	  y.	  But	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  either	  the	  fact	  that	  x	  grounds	  y	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  x	   is	  more	  fundamental	  than	  y	  or	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  it	  does.	  Let	  us	  assume	  that	  the	  more	  fundamental	  than	  relation	  is	  asymmetric	  and	  irreflexive.	   But	   what	   is	   it	   to	   be	   more	   fundamental	   than	   something	   else?	   One	  answer	  is	  that	  it	  is	  to	  be	  closer	  to	  a	  fundamental	  (that	  is,	  ungrounded)	  entity	  than	  another	  thing	  (where	  it	   is	  understood	  that	  a	  fundamental	  entity	  is	  as	  close	  to	  a	  fundamental	   entity	   –	   itself	   –	   as	   anything	   can	   be).	   And	   the	   obvious	   way	   to	  understand	  this	  idea	  is	  that	  x	  is	  closer	  to	  a	  fundamental	  entity	  than	  y	  if	  and	  only	  if,	   in	   their	   chain	   of	   grounding,	   there	   are	   fewer	   elements	   between	   x	   and	   a	  fundamental	  entity	  than	  between	  y	  and	  a	  fundamental	  entity.	  Now	  the	  relation	  of	  grounding	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  finite	  chains.	  Nothing	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  grounding	  excludes	  the	  possibility	  of	  chains	  of	  grounding	  containing	  infinitely	   many	   distinct	   elements	   and	   such	   that	   there	   is	   no	   first	   element,	   no	  ungrounded	  ground.	  For	  instance,	  if	  wholes	  are	  grounded	  in	  their	  parts,	  a	  gunky	  whole,	  i.e.	  a	  whole	  all	  of	  whose	  parts	  have	  proper	  parts,	  would	  be	  at	  the	  top	  of	  an	  infinitely	  long	  chain	  of	  grounding	  with	  no	  first	  element.	  Now	  take	  two	  members	  of	  such	  a	  chain,	  x	  and	  y,	  such	  that	  x	  grounds	  y.	  Is	  x	  more	  fundamental	  than	  y?	  No,	  for	  there	  is	  no	  fundamental	  entity	  in	  their	  chain	  of	  grounding,	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  there	  are	  fewer	  elements	  between	  x	  and	  a	  fundamental	  entity	  than	  between	  y	  and	  a	  fundamental	  entity.	  	  If	  so,	  that	  x	  grounds	  y	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  x	   is	  more	  fundamental	  than	  y,	  and	   so	   the	   fact	   that	   reflexive	   and	   symmetric	   cases	   of	   grounding	   are	   cases	   in	  which	  the	  more	  fundamental	  than	  relation	  does	  not	  obtain	  between	  the	  ground	  and	   the	   grounded	   is	   no	   objection	   to	   them.	   Reflexive	   and	   symmetric	   cases	   of	  grounding	  are	   like	  bottomless	  chains	  of	  grounding:	  cases	  of	  grounding	  without	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different	  degrees	  of	  fundamentality.	  And	  in	  all	  three	  cases	  the	  reason	  why	  there	  are	   no	   different	   degrees	   of	   fundamentality	   is	   that	   there	   are	   no	   fundamental	  entities	  in	  the	  chains	  of	  grounding:	  neither	  bottomless	  chains	  of	  grounding,	  nor	  ‘reflexive’	   chains	   of	   grounding,	   nor	   ‘symmetric’	   chains	   of	   grounding,	   contain	  fundamental,	  ungrounded	  entities.11	  	  It	  might	   be	   objected	   that	   there	   cannot	   be	   bottomless	   grounding	   chains,	  that	   is,	   that	   every	   chain	  must	   end	   in	   an	  ungrounded	  ground.	   I	   do	  not	   see	  why	  there	   cannot	  be	   such	   ‘bottomless’	   chains.	  But	   I	  do	  not	  need	   their	  possibility	   to	  make	  my	  point.	  For	   it	   is	  sufficient	  that	  there	  can	  be	  dense	  chains	  of	  grounding,	  that	   is,	   chains	   of	   grounding	   such	   that	   between	   any	   two	   elements	   there	   is	   a	  further	  element.	  In	  this	  case	  it	  will	  also	  be	  true	  that	  no	  element	  of	  such	  a	  chain	  will	   be	   closer	   to	   a	   fundamental	   entity	   than	   any	   other	   element	   of	   it	   (except,	   of	  course,	  when	  the	  member	  in	  question	  is	  the	  ungrounded	  ground	  of	  the	  chain).	  	  It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  the	  real	  number	  line	  is	  dense	  but	  one	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  one	  positive	  real	  being	  closer	  to	  zero	  than	  another	  positive	  real.	  But	  this	  is	  because	  we	  can	   independently	  make	  sense	  of	   the	  notion	  of	  one	  positive	  real	  being	   bigger	   or	   smaller	   than	   another	   one.	   In	   this	   case	  we	   are	  working	  with	   a	  notion	  of	  relative	  fundamentality	  according	  to	  which	  x	  is	  closer	  to	  a	  fundamental	  entity	   than	   y	   if	   and	   only	   if,	   in	   their	   respective	   chains	   of	   grounding,	   there	   are	  fewer	   elements	   between	   x	   and	   a	   fundamental	   entity	   than	   between	   y	   and	   a	  fundamental	  entity.	  A	  better	  objection	  would	  be	  against	   the	  characterization	   I	  have	  given	  of	  what	   it	   is	   to	   be	   more	   fundamental	   than	   something	   else.	   Perhaps	   x	   is	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	   Note	   that	   there	   is	   a	   sense	   in	   which	   a	   self-­‐grounder	   is	   more	   fundamental	   than	   something	  grounded	  in	  something	  else,	  even	  if	  the	  self-­‐grounder	  is	  not	  an	  ungrounded	  entity.	  This	  has	  two	  consequences.	  One	  is	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  being	  more	  fundamental	  than,	  understood	  as	  being	  closer	  to	  a	   fundamental,	   ungrounded,	   entity,	   cannot	   be	   straightforwardly	   extended	   to	   apply	   to	   cases	   of	  entities	  belonging	  to	  different	  chains	  of	  grounding.	  For	  something	  that	  is	  its	  own	  sole	  ground	  is	  no	  closer	  to	  an	  ungrounded	  entity	  than	  something	  that	  is	  grounded	  in	  an	  ungrounded	  entity,	  and	  yet	   the	   former	   seems	  more	   fundamental	   than	   the	   latter.	   The	   other	   consequence	   is	   that	   a	   self-­‐grounder	  that	  grounds	  something	  else	  is	  more	  fundamental	  than	  what	  it	  grounds,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  closer	   to	   an	  ungrounded	  entity.	   Thanks	   to	  Paul	  Audi	   for	  making	  me	   think	  of	   these	  points.	  The	  solution	  is	  to	  redefine,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  present	  definition	  of	  being	  more	  fundamental	  than,	  a	  fundamental	   entity	   as	  one	   that	   is	   either	  ungrounded	  or	  has	  no	  grounds	  other	   than	   itself.	   Even	  under	   this	  definition	  of	  a	   fundamental	  entity	   it	   is	   still	   the	   case	   that	  no	  member	  of	  an	   infinitely	  long	  descending	  chain	  of	  grounding	  will	  be	  closer	  to	  a	  fundamental	  entity	  than	  any	  other	  member	  of	  it,	  and	  that	  the	  members	  of	  ‘reflexive’	  and	  ‘symmetric’	  chains	  of	  grounding	  (at	  least	  the	  kinds	  of	  such	  chains	  I	  have	  considered	  in	  this	  paper)	  will	  not	  be	  closer	  to	  a	  fundamental	  entity	  than	  any	  other	  member	  of	  them.	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fundamental	  than	  y	  if	  and	  only	  if	  every	  ground	  of	  x	  is	  a	  ground	  of	  y	  but	  not	  vice	  
versa?	   This	   definition	   is	   satisfied	   by	   suitable	   pairs	   of	   elements	   in	   grounding	  chains	  with	  infinitely	  many	  elements,	  whether	  such	  chains	  have	  an	  ungrounded	  first	  element	  or	  not.12	  But,	   if	   this	   is	  what	  being	  more	   fundamental	   than	   is,	  what	  reasons	  are	  there	   for	   thinking	  that	   if	  x	  grounds	  y,	  x	  must	  be	  more	   fundamental	  than	  y?	  There	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  any.	  Indeed,	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  no	  reasons	  why	  if	  
x	   grounds	  y	   then	   everything	   in	   virtue	  of	  which	   x	   is	   F	   is	   something	   in	   virtue	  of	  which	   y	   is	   F,	   but	   not	   vice	   versa.	   Furthermore,	   my	   counterexamples	   to	   the	  irreflexivity	   and	   the	   asymmetry	   of	   grounding	   are	   counterexamples	   to	   the	   idea	  that	  if	  x	  grounds	  y,	  every	  ground	  of	  x	  must	  be	  a	  ground	  of	  y	  but	  not	  vice	  versa.	  So,	  not	  only	  do	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  no	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	   if	  x	  grounds	  y,	  x	  must	  be	  more	  fundamental	  than	  y	  in	  this	  sense,	  there	  are	  actually	  reasons	  against	  it.	  	  Finally,	  one	  might	  say	  that	  x’s	  being	  more	  fundamental	  than	  y	  means	  that	  
x	  grounds	  y	  but	  is	  not	  grounded	  in	  it.	  But,	  again,	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  no	  reason	  for	  thinking	  that	  if	  this	  is	  what	  being	  more	  fundamental	  than	  something	  means,	  then	  grounding	   something	   entails	   being	   more	   fundamental	   than	   it.	   For	   there	   is	   no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  if	  x	  grounds	  y	  then,	  although	  y	  is	  F	  in	  virtue	  of	  x,	  x	  is	  not	  F	  in	  virtue	  of	  y.	  And,	  again,	  my	  examples	  constitute	  reasons	  against	  the	  idea	  that	  if	  x	  grounds	  y	  then	  x	  is	  not	  grounded	  in	  y.	  	  Analogous	   replies	   could	   be	  made	   if	   someone	   objected	   that	   truthmaking	  must	   be	   asymmetric	   because	   if	   x	   is	   a	   truthmaker	   of	   y,	   x	   must	   be	   more	  fundamental	  than	  y.	  	  	   So	   these	   objections	   can	   be	   repelled.	   If	   my	   point	   that	   grounding	   is	   not	  asymmetric	   stands,	   it	   follows	   that	   grounding	   does	   not	   entail	   being	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Three	  comments	  on	  the	  definition.	  (a)	  According	  to	  this	  definition	  a	  fundamental	  thing	  is	  more	  fundamental	  than	  what	  it	  grounds	  since	  they	  vacuously	  satisfy	  the	  condition	  that	  every	  ground	  of	  the	   fundamental	   thing	   is	   a	   ground	   of	  what	   it	   grounds	   and	   non-­‐vacuously	   satisfy	   the	   condition	  that	  not	  every	  ground	  of	  what	  the	  fundamental	  thing	  grounds	  is	  a	  ground	  of	  it.	  (b)	  As	  formulated,	  this	   definition	   restricts	   the	   relation	  of	  being	  more	   fundamental	   than	   to	   pairs	   of	   things	   that	   are	  elements	  of	  the	  same	  grounding	  chain.	  If	  something	  like	  this	  definition	  is	  correct,	  then	  whether	  it	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  apply	  to	  pairs	  of	  things	  from	  different	  chains	  should	  be	  investigated.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  paper	  and	  the	  objection	  I	  am	  considering	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  whether	  or	  not	   such	   a	   definition	   can	   be	   thus	   extended.	   (c)	   As	   formulated,	   this	   definition	   assumes	   the	  transitivity	  of	  grounding.	  A	  more	  careful	  formulation	  of	  the	  definition,	  which	  does	  not	  assume	  the	  transitivity	   of	   grounding,	   says	   that	   x	   is	   more	   fundamental	   than	   y	   if	   and	   only	   if	   the	   transitive	  closure	  of	  the	  grounds	  of	  x	   is	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  transitive	  closure	  of	  the	  grounds	  of	  y,	  but	  not	  vice	  
versa.	  But	  it	  is	  only	  for	  simplicity	  that	  I	  gave	  the	  less	  careful	  formulation	  and,	  anyway,	  the	  point	  I	  make	   in	   the	   text	  against	   the	   less	  careful	  version	  of	   the	  definition	  would	  also	  apply	   to	   the	  more	  careful	  version.	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fundamental	   than.	   Thus	   it	   follows	   that	   grounding	   is	   not	   a	   relation	   of	   relative	  fundamentality,	  to	  use	  an	  expression	  of	  Bennett’s	  (Bennett,	  forthcoming).	  	  	   But	  there	  is	  another	  possible	  objection	  to	  my	  arguments	  that	  grounding	  is	  not	  asymmetric.	  This	  is	  that	  grounding	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  explanation	  and	  explanations	  are	   asymmetric.	   For	   instance,	   Fine	   says	   that	   ‘there	   is	   a	   plausible	   demand	   on	  ground	  or	  explanation	  that	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  evade.	  For	  given	  a	  truth	  that	  stands	  in	  need	  of	  explanation,	  one	  naturally	  supposes	  that	  it	  should	  have	  a	  “completely	  satisfactory”	   explanation,	   one	   that	   does	   not	   involve	   cycles	   and	   terminates	   in	  truths	  that	  do	  not	  stand	  in	  need	  of	  an	  explanation’	  (Fine	  2010:	  105).	  This	  appeal	  to	   the	   asymmetry	  of	   explanation	   to	  defend	   the	   asymmetry	  of	   grounding	   is	   not	  uncommon	  (Audi	  2012a:	  102,	  Rosen	  2010:	  116).	  	  Now,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  explanations,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  propositions	  put	  forward	  by	   an	   enquirer	   to	   advance	   our	   understanding,	   are	   asymmetric.	   Let	   us	   call	  explanations	   in	   this	   sense	   epistemic	   explanations.	   But	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	  extrapolate	   the	   formal	   features	  of	   epistemic	   explanations	   to	   grounding.	   I	   think	  that	  there	  is	  a	  close	  connection	  between	  epistemic	  explanations	  and	  grounding,	  namely	  that	  explanations	  track	  determinative	  relations	  and	  since	  grounding	  is	  a	  determinative	   relation,	   many	   explanations	   track	   grounding	   relations	   (cf.	  Rodriguez-­‐Pereyra	   2005:	   28).	   But	   it	   does	   not	   follow	   that	   grounding	   must	   be	  asymmetric	  because	  epistemic	  explanations	  are.	  Indeed,	  it	  does	  not	  even	  follow	  that	   every	   relation	   of	   grounding	   must	   be	   susceptible	   of	   being	   tracked	   or	  represented	  by	  an	  epistemic	  explanation.	  	  But	  the	  thought	  might	  be	  that	  there	  is	  a	  non-­‐epistemic	  asymmetric	  sort	  of	  explanation	  and	  that	  grounding	  is	  such	  a	  non-­‐epistemic	  sort	  of	  explanation	  or	  is	  at	  least	  a	  species	  of	  it.13	  Something	  like	  this	  is	  what	  Fine	  seems	  to	  be	  assuming	  in	  the	  passage	  I	  quoted	  above,	  when	  he	  speaks	  of	   ‘grounding	  or	  explanation’.	  But,	  whatever	   Fine	   was	   assuming,	   the	   idea	   that	   grounding	   is	   a	   non-­‐epistemic	  asymmetric	  sort	  of	  explanation	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  an	  objection	  against	  my	  points	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Here	  non-­‐epistemic	  explanation	  should	  not	  be	  equated	  with	  metaphysical	  explanation	   in	   the	  sense	   in	  which	   the	   latter	   is	   contrasted	  with	   causal	   explanation.	   Both	  metaphysical	   and	   causal	  explanations	  can	  be	  types	  of	  epistemic	  explanations	  –	  the	  difference	  is	  that	  one	  tries	  to	  illuminate	  a	  phenomenon	  by	  pointing	  to	  its	  causal	  history	  while	  the	  other	  tries	  to	  illuminate	  a	  phenomenon	  by	  pointing	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  metaphysical	  antecedent.	  If	  equated	  with	  metaphysical	  explanation,	  non-­‐epistemic	   explanation	   should	   be	   equated	  with	   it	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   latter	   is	   contrasted	  with	  epistemic	  explanation.	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that	  grounding	  is	  not	  asymmetric.	  For	  in	  that	  case	  the	  objector	  would	  be	  saying:	  your	  thesis	  that	  grounding	  is	  not	  asymmetric	  must	  be	  wrong	  because	  grounding	  is	  asymmetric.	  Such	  objection	  has	  no	  force.	  	  But	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   grounding	   is	   not	   asymmetric.	   It	   follows	   that	  grounding	  is	  not	  a	  non-­‐epistemic	  asymmetric	  explanatory	  relation.	  	  	  7.	  Schaffer	  has	  proposed	  a	  contrastive	  account	  of	  grounding	  according	  to	  which	  grounding	  is	  a	  quaternary	  relation	  of	  the	  form:	  the	  fact	  that	  F	  rather	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  F*	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  G	  rather	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  G*,	  where	  the	  facts	  that	  F	  and	  G	  are	  required	  to	  be	  obtaining	  facts	  and	  the	  facts	  that	  F*	  and	  G*	  are	  required	  to	  be	  non-­‐obtaining	  facts.	  Schaffer	  thinks	  that	  grounding	  respects	  the	  principles	  of	   transitivity,	   asymmetry,	   and	   reflexivity	   when	   these	   are	   formulated	   for	  differences.	  Thus:	  	  Differential	   irreflexivity:	   It	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   F	   rather	   than	   F*	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  F	  rather	  than	  F*.	  	  Differential	  asymmetry:	   If	   the	  fact	  that	  F	  rather	  than	  F*	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  G	  rather	  than	  G*,	  then	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  G	  rather	  than	  G*	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  F	  rather	  than	  F*	  	  Differential	   transitivity:	   If	   the	   fact	   that	  F	  rather	  than	  F*	  grounds	  the	   fact	   that	  G	  rather	  than	  G*,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  G	  rather	  than	  G*	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  H	  rather	  than	  H*,	  then	  the	  fact	  that	  F	  rather	  than	  F*	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  H	  rather	  than	  H*.	  	  	  Schaffer	  argues	  that	  his	  counterexamples	  to	  the	  transitivity	  of	  grounding	  are	  not	  counterexamples	   to	   the	   differential	   transitivity	   of	   grounding.	   And	   he	   suggests	  (2012:	  133,	  fn.	  17)	  that	  Jenkins’	  counterexample	  to	  the	  irreflexivity	  of	  grounding	  does	   not	   threaten	   differential	   irreflexivity.	   This	   suggests	   that	   a	   quaternary	  relation	  of	  grounding	  may	  be	  a	  strict	  order.	  But	  my	  examples	  are	  also	  examples	  against	  differential	   irreflexivity	   and	  differential	  asymmetry	  of	  grounding.	  The	  fact	  that	  B	  is	  true	  rather	  than	  B	  is	  not	  true	   grounds	   the	   fact	   that	   B	   is	   true	   rather	   than	   B	   is	   not	   true.	   So	   differential	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irreflexivity	  fails.	  And	  the	  fact	  that	  E	  is	  true	  rather	  than	  E	  is	  not	  true	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  F	  is	  true	  rather	  than	  F	  is	  not	  true,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  F	  is	  true	  rather	  than	  F	  is	  not	  true	  grounds	  the	  fact	  that	  E	  is	  true	  rather	  than	  E	  is	  not	  true.	  So	  differential	  asymmetry	  fails.	  	  	   Therefore,	  taking	  grounding	  to	  be	  a	  quaternary	  relation	  does	  not	  make	  it	  a	  strict	  order.	  	  	  8.	  To	  conclude,	  truthmaking	  is	  neither	  transitive,	  nor	  irreflexive,	  nor	  asymmetric,	  and	  alethic-­‐fact	  grounding	  is	  neither	  irreflexive	  nor	  asymmetric.	  Since	  those	  two	  relations	  are	  species	  or	  cases	  of	  grounding,	  grounding	   is	  neither	  transitive,	  nor	  irreflexive,	  nor	  asymmetric,	  and	  so	  grounding	  is	  not	  a	  strict	  order.	  This	  has	  some	  consequences.	  One	  consequence	  of	  this	   is	  that	   if	  x	  grounds	  y,	   it	  does	  not	   follow	  that	  x	   is	  more	   fundamental	   than	  y.	  Thus	  grounding	   is	  not	  a	   relation	  of	   relative	  fundamentality.	  Another	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that,	  if	  non-­‐epistemic	  explanation	  is	  an	  asymmetric	  relation,	  grounding	  is	  not	  non-­‐epistemic	  explanation.	  The	  link	  between	   grounding	   and	   explanation	   consists	   in	   that	   instances	   in	   which	  grounding	   occurs	   irreflexively	   and	   asymmetrically	   back	   up	   epistemic	  explanations.	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